Houthi forces completed their takeover of Yemen’s Red Sea coastline over the weekend of 11-12 September 2026, capturing the port of Mocha and the island of Mayyun, also known as Perim, and taking control of the Bab el-Mandeb strait, one of the world’s busiest and most contested waterways. The advance placed Houthi positions roughly 20 kilometres from the African coast at the strait’s narrowest point.
Hazem al-Assad, a member of the Houthi movement’s politburo, said “freedom of navigation and international trade in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb are safe and orderly.” Yemen’s internationally recognised government and Saudi Arabia, whose vessels the Houthis have separately barred from the route, dispute that characterisation; a Houthi military spokesman said navigation remained open to all shipping companies except Saudi-flagged ships.
Egypt watches, and prepares
Egypt, whose Suez Canal revenue depends heavily on Red Sea traffic continuing to flow, has so far avoided direct military involvement but has formed a crisis team to monitor developments around the strait. Suez Canal Authority chairman Osama Rabie sought to reassure shipping companies on 20 September, saying “the canal is safe, navigation is regular, its services are operating efficiently.” The canal’s revenues have already been battered by more than two years of Houthi disruption: Egypt lost roughly $7 billion, about 60 percent of the canal’s revenue, between 2023 and 2024 as shipping companies rerouted around southern Africa.
A tenth of world trade at stake
The Bab el-Mandeb strait carries close to 10 percent of global trade and an estimated 5 to 7 percent of seaborne oil shipments. Global shipping volumes through the Red Sea are estimated to have fallen by around half since 2023, with many vessels now taking the longer route around the Cape of Good Hope, adding more than three weeks to voyages and raising freight costs worldwide. Maritime security analysts note that Houthi control of both shores of the strait’s narrowest section makes attacks on shipping technically easier to carry out than when the group operated only from Yemen’s mainland coast.
Why it matters
Control of a chokepoint is not the same as control of the sea lane’s fate: Egypt, Saudi Arabia and international shipping interests all have reasons to avoid a wider war even as they reject the Houthis’ claim to guarantee safe passage. Egypt’s restraint so far reflects the limits of what any single regional power can do about a threat that requires either a negotiated understanding with the Houthis or a multinational naval response, neither of which has materialised despite more than two years of disruption. How long that restraint holds may depend on whether the group’s presence on both sides of the strait pushes insurance and rerouting costs high enough to force a change in regional diplomacy.
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